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The Robot Koseki:
A Japanese Law Model for
Regulating Autonomous
Machines
COLIN P.A. JONES*©
ABSTRACT
After touching on some of the conceptual and practical
hurdles facing the developing field of robot law, this
article will describe the Japanese koseki system of family
registration and then explain why it offers a source of
models and analogies that are useful in the development
of a framework for regulating robots.
INTRODUCTION: WHAT TO DO ABOUT ROBOTS
A review of the growing body of literature on the relatively
new subject of “robotics law” reveals a number of common
themes. For example, many works reflexively reference
Isaac Asimov’s famous but fictional “three laws of robotics”
as a touchstone,1 though it is unclear whether they will
* Professor, Doshisha Law School (Kyoto, Japan); A.B., UC Berkeley;
LL.M., Tohoku University Graduate Faculty of Law; J.D. and LL.M.,
Duke Law School, Life Member, Clare Hall, The University of
Cambridge. The author would like to acknowledge the helpful
comments of participants in the 2019 WeRobot conference, in
particular: Michael Froomkin, Kate Darling, Hideyuki Matsumi and
Takayuki Katż.
© Colin P.A. Jones 2019.
1 See, e.g., Bryan Casey, Comment, Amoral Machines, or: How
Roboticists can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Law, 112 NW. U.
L. REV. 1347, 1351–52 (2017); Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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prove to offer any useful guidance in the real world. 2
There already being a growing body of literature on the
subject of whether autonomous armed drones or other
robotic weaponry should be allowed to make “kill”
decisions without human intervention, 3 with some
authors advocating in favor of doing so, even Asimov’s
most important, first law (“A robot may not harm a human
being”) seems unlikely to be implemented in the real
world.4
Other common themes addressed in the literature
on robot law include who (if anyone) should be liable when
of Artificial Intelligence Entities 2–3 (Feb. 15, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) https://ssrn.com/abstract=1564096. The three laws of
robotics were first introduced in “Runaround,” a 1942 short story that
was included in Isaac Asimov’s book, I ROBOT.
2 Professor Laurel Riek & Professor Don Howard, A Code of Ethics
for the Human-Robot Interaction Profession, Presentation at the
WeRobot Conference (Apr. 4, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2757805 (“In the robot ethics literature, Isaac Asimov’s laws of
robotics (Asimov, 1942) have so dominated discussion about the ethics
of human-robot interaction as to eclipse the day-to-day ethical
challenges facing HRI research, development, and marketing.”). The
“Asimov-as-starting” point notion is not limited to Western writers.
In one of the few Japanese books on the law of robots, Professor
Susumu Hirano also starts his discussion of the subject with the
Three Laws, also noting that Asimov subsequently added a “zeroeth”
law (“A robot may not injure humanity or, through inaction, allow
humanity to come to harm”) in his 1985 book, Robots and Empire.
Susumu Hirano, ROBOTTO HŻ [ROBOT LAW] 9–22 (2017).
3 See, e.g., Michael Schmitt & Jeffrey Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”:
Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 241 (2013); William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil,
Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next Generation of War
Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1155 (2013).
4 John Yoo, Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New
Weapons Technologies, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 488 (2017) (suggesting
that “[d]eployment of robotics could advance the humanitarian goal of
reducing the death and suffering of combat, once it begins, far more
effectively than a complete ban.”).
404
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robots cause harm, 5 whether robots can or should be
subject to criminal liability, how robots should act when
faced with the “trolley problem,”6 who should enjoy the
benefits of whatever value a robot or its programming
creates (such as intellectual property), 7 how to address
disagreements between human and robotic “experts,” 8
the ethics of human-robot interactions,9 whether robots
See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals Liability
Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 125 (2014); F.
Patrick Hubbard, Regulation of and Liability for Risks of Physical
Injury from “Sophisticated Robots” at 44, Presentation at the We
Robot Conference (Apr. 21–22, 2012), http://robots.law.miami.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Hubbard_Sophisticated-Robots-Draft-1.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Sabine Gless, Emily Silverman & Thomas Weigend, If
Robots Cause Harm, Who is To Blame? Self-Driving Cars and
Criminal Liability, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 412, 420 (2016); David Levy,
When Robots Do Wrong, in COGNITIVE ROBOTICS 3, 6–11 (Hooman
Samani, ed., 2016); Hallevy, supra note 1, at 4; Abhuiday Chandra,
Liability Issues in Relation to Autonomous AI Systems 4 (Sept. 29,
2017) (unpublished manuscript) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3052154;
Peter Asaro, Robots and Responsibility from a Legal Perspective
(January 20, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with HUMLab,
Umeå University of Umeå, Sweden); Peter Asaro, The Liability
Problem for Artificial Agents, ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2015). The trolley problem is a classical
ethics problem involving a choice between operating a switch so as to
prevent a runaway trolley from running into a group of people but in
doing so cause it to run into a single or lesser number of people. Casey,
supra note 1, at 1348–49 (noting that in 2016 Mercedes announced
that it would deal with the real-world version of the problem by
programming its self-driving cars to protect passengers at the
expense of pedestrians if necessary).
7 See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity, Copyright and the
Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 21 (2012);
Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative
Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up? 71 TUL.
L. REV. 1675, 1681 (1997).
8 Millar & Kerr, infra note 36, at 104.
9 See, e.g. Riek and Howard, supra note 2, at 1.
5
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should be granted legal personality,10 pay taxes,11 have
freedom of speech or any other rights, 12 or simply be
treated by the law the same as humans.13
Possible answers to these various questions tend
to start from seemingly familiar, neighboring areas of
existing law: products liability, tort and insurance law for
10 Possibly the earliest proposal that robots, or rather AI, be accorded
legal personality was made by Lawrence Solum, in 1991. Lawrence B.
Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1231, 1255–56 (1992). See, e.g., Joanna Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis
& Thomas D. Grant, Of, For, and By the People: The Legal Lacuna of
Synthetic Persons (U. Cambridge Legal Stud. Working Paper No.
5/2018, 2018); Evan J. Zimmerman, Machine Minds: Frontiers in
Legal Personhood 38 (Aug. 28, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2563965.
11 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay
Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
145 (2018). See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should
Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 145, 149 (2018).
12 See, e.g., Toni Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech
Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. L. REV. 1170, 1173 (2016);
Nathan Heller, If Animals Have Rights, Should Robots?, NEW YORKER
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/28/ifanimals-have-rights-should-robots; David J. Gunkel, The Other
Question: Can and Should Robots have Rights?, 20 ETHICS INFO. TECH.
87, 88 (2017); Joanna J. Bryson, Robots Should Be Slaves, in CLOSE
ENGAGEMENTS WITH ARTIFICIAL COMPANIONS: KEY SOCIAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETHICAL AND DESIGN ISSUE 63, 63 (Yorick Wilks ed.,
2010).
13 Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of Humans 2
(Oxford Legal Stud. Working Paper No. 27/2017, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941001 (“If [the deep normative structure
of a society] is utilitarian, smart robots should, in the not too distant
future, be treated like humans. That means that they should be
accorded legal personality, have the power to acquire and hold
property and to conclude contracts.”).
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self-driving cars,14 the laws of conflict for killer drones,15
corporate law for robotic legal personality,16 and so forth.
Even efforts to address the subject more holistically seem
to do so by referencing recent noteworthy interactions of
law and new technology, such as Ryan Calo’s seminal
2015 article Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw.17
Yet none of these approaches seem likely to lead to
the development of a foundational “law of robots,” though
that might be what is actually needed. For all the talk of
robots as an emergent technology, perhaps the laws we
need to consider for dealing with them are not as new as
we think. For example, the ancient remedy of deodands—
suing animals or even inanimate objects that cause harm
so they can be taken, sold and the proceeds used for
compensation—might be a perfectly plausible way of
See, e.g., Victor Schwartz, Driverless Cars: The Legal Landscape,
in TORTS OF THE FUTURE 5, 9 (U.S. Chamber Inst. Legal Reform (June
14, 2017)); Stephen S. Wu, Product Liability in the U.S. and
Associated Risk Management, in AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: TECHNICAL,
LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 553, 553–54 (2016); Steven Seidenberg,
Who’s to Blame When Self-Driving Cars Crash?, ABA J. (July 2017),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/selfdriving_liability_hig
hly_automated_vehicle?icn=most_read; John Villasenor, Products
Liability and Driverless Cars: Issues and Guiding Principles for
Legislation, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REP. (Apr. 24, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/products-liability-anddriverless-cars-issues-and-guiding-principles-for-legislation/;
Vladeck, supra note 5, at 125 (discussing generally how existing rules
of products liability could apply to AI-enabled machines).
15
See, e.g., Christopher Ford, Autonomous Weapons and
International Law, 69 S.C. L. REV. 413, 416 (2017); Schmitt &
Thurnher, supra note 3, at 243.
16 See, e.g., S.M. Solaiman, Legal Personality of Robots, Corporations,
Idols and Chimpanzees: A Quest for Legitimacy, 25 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND L. 155 (2017), http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=4088&context=lhapapers.
17 Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
513, 552 (2015).
14
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dealing with robots that commit torts or crimes,
particularly expensive ones whose owners would thus
have an incentive to pay attention to their safe use and
procure insurance.18
After all, the law has been dealing with artificial
persons—corporations—for centuries, and there is
already useful literature on the analogies to corporate law
and the legally significant differences between
corporations and robots.19 An obvious difference, of course,
is that corporations only “think” though human agents,
and lack the ability to directly affect the physical world.
The point is that the idea of recognizing separate legal
status in something artificial is hardly new.
The law has also been dealing with unpredictable
moving creatures—animals—for centuries. Some writers
have even suggested that regarding robots as animals
might be an appropriate response for the legal system.20
Of course this may also not be a wholly useful analogy in
that it does not address whether and how to attribute
property or other rights, agency or legal personality to
robots. It also potentially leaves victims potentially
uncompensated for harm caused by “wild animal” robots,
where the person responsible for introducing them into
human communities can be identified. Nonetheless, there
would seem an ample source of antecedents for robot law
in what many technology lawyers may regard as the dusty
corner of tort and property law. As we shall see, the more
See, e.g., Edmund W. Burke, Deodand – A Legal Antiquity That
May Still Exist, 8 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 15, 15–16 (1930); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289–90.
19 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
20 Enrique Schaerer, Richard I. Kelley & Monica N. Nicolescu, Robots
as Animals: A Framework for Liability and Responsibility in HumanRobot Interactions, Presentation at the 18th IEEE International
Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication 72
(Sept. 22–Oct. 2, 2009).
18
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modern practice of “chipping” pets by embedding RFID
tags containing identifying information is another area
where animals provide a useful reference for a system of
regulating robots.21
Then there is family law, which few if any authors
seem to mention as a possible reference. Yet family law
may actually offer the best source of analogies for a law of
robots. After all, it is widely expected that robots will
increasingly come to live in our homes as servants or
companions (many already do in the form of vacuum
cleaners or toys), and there is already a healthy (?)
discourse on the subject of robot sex partners.22
21 See, e.g. Habib Doùan, Mehmet Caglar, Musa Yavuz & Mahmut
Gözel, Use of Radio Frequency Identification Systems on Animal
Monitoring. 8 SDU INT’L J. OF TECHNOLOGICAL SCI. 38, 39 (2016) (the
use of similar technology by some humans within the context of an
employment relationship for purposes such as access to facilities is
also highly relevant to the type of system of robot regulation proposed
by this article); Mary Bowerman, Wisconsin Company to Install RiceSized Microchips in Employees, USA TODAY (July 24, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/nation-now/2017/07/24/
wisconsin-company-install-rice-sized-microchips-employees/5038670
01/ (‘“We foresee the use of RFID technology to drive everything from
making purchases in our office break room market, opening doors, use
of copy machines, logging into our office computers, unlocking phones,
sharing business cards, storing medical/health information, and used
as payment at other RFID terminals,’ CEO Todd Westby said in a
company statement. ‘Eventually, this technology will become
standardized allowing you to use this as your passport, public transit,
all purchasing opportunities, etc.’” Whether the use of such
technology is appropriate for the private or public regulations of
human beings is, of course, an important question. However, the
answer to that question is arguably irrelevant to whether comparable
technology would be useful in regulating robots).
22 See, e.g., Chelsea Summers, There are a Lot of Problems with Sex
Robots, MEDIUM (July 26, 2018), https://medium.com/s/future
human/there-are-a-lot-of-problems-with-sex-robots-38ea0c17b7db.
See also, Gutiu, infra note 35, at 187.
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Family law may be a useful reference because it
addresses a collective in which individual members may
be liable for or benefit from what is essentially a social
unit, a collective enterprise: the family. One of the basic
problems with characterizing how the law should deal
with robots is that each robot is effectively a discrete unit,
but one whose existence and actions are usually the result
of a collective enterprise: manufacturer, programmer,
owner, user and so forth.
Many of the questions about robotics law
summarized at the beginning of this article stem from the
ability of robots to act with agency in a way that affects
the physical world in a potentially harmful way, combined
with uncertainty as to the allocation of rights and
responsibilities accruing to robot behavior. Like robots,
children have agency and can move unpredictably in the
physical world, causing harm to others. Family law has
been dealing with parental liability for the torts and
crimes of minors for a long time.23 Many of the issues of
robot law might be amenable to an approach that sees
robots treated analogously to “perpetual children.” The
provisions on parental liability for harm caused by
children contained in §316 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts might provide as useful a model for allocating
responsibility for robots as anything in products liability
or criminal law—if we could just figure out who the
“parents” are, a definitional and informational issue we
will turn to shortly. 24 Similarly, questions like who is
See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Tort Liability for Intentional Acts of
Family Members: Will Your Insurer Stand By You?, 68 TENN. L. REV.
1, 6 (2000); Jason Emilios Dimitris, Comment, Parental
Responsibility Status—and the Programs that Must Accompany Them,
27 STETSON L. REV. 655, 661 (1997).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DUTY OF PARENT TO CONTROL
CONDUCT OF CHILD § 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1965):
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control
23
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entitled to manage and dispose the fruits of a robot’s labor
are also a fairly standard issue of family law in the parentchild relationship, at least they were in days gone by.25
Children are not the only area of family law that
may be a useful reference. The field also deals with
responsibility for adults with diminished capacity, those
judicially declared incompetent or subject to guardianship
or conservatorships.26
Family law might also offer useful analogies in
areas where there is an odd silence in the current
literature about robot law. While some writers express
concern about excessive liability hindering innovation in
robotics, nobody has gone so far as to suggest there should
be a “parent-child immunity” rule that would make
recovery difficult for harms caused as between the robot
and its owner or developer.27 Similarly, those advocating
independent legal personhood do not seem to have gone so
far as to advocate it rendering robots able to
independently bring suit in their own name, including
against their owners or other parties involved in their
his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others
or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to them, if the parent:
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to
control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control.
25 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453 (“A father
has no other power over his son’s estate, than as his trustee or
guardian; for, though he may receive the profits during the child's
minority, yet he must account for them when he comes of age. He may
indeed have the benefit of his children's labour while they live with
him, and are maintained by him: but this is no more than he is
entitled to from his apprentices or servants.”).
26 See, e.g., DANBY P. FRY, THE LUNACY ACTS (1864).
27 See, e.g., Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in
Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 489 (1982).
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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existence or operation. Corporations can sue their own
directors and shareholders,28 and parents may be subject
to suits by or on behalf of their children, so why not robots
who can sue their owners and creators, or robot
whistleblowers able to independently inform authorities
of human malfeasance? 29 Similarly, if we are to worry
about the “abuse” of robots, as some writers have
suggested we should,30 why not allow them legal recourse
against their abusers, or at least allow third parties to
seek such recourse on their behalf? Here too we see
existing family law on subjects such as child and elder
abuse offering a potentially useful model for regulation.
Finally, family may be a useful reference because,
as we shall see later in this article, family status and the
way it is authenticated can be an important aspect of a
person's legal identity. And robotic identity—what
constitutes a robot?—is a central element to many issues
of robot law.
See, e.g., Eleanor Bloxham, A Lazy, Expensive Way to Intimidate
Shareholders, FORTUNE (Mar. 14, 2014), http://fortune.com/
2014/03/14/a-lazy-expensive-way-to-intimidate-shareholders/
(“Corporations unhappy with shareholder proposals are taking their
frustrations to federal court, suing investors . . . .”); David Hall & Matt
Walker, When Can a Company Sue its Directors for Their Illegal Acts?,
BURGES SALMON (May 2015), https://www.burges-salmon.com//media/files/publications/open-access/when_can_a_company_sue_its_
directors_for_their_illegal_acts.pdf; Michelle Singletary, Daughter 18,
Sues Parents for Support, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/economy/daughter-18-sues-parents-for
-support/2014/03/06/75beb836-a49e-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.
html?utm_term=.bbc69d484e8b.
29 Perhaps this is a matter for joint discussions with those who focus
on when autonomous weapons should be allowed to kill humans,
including possibly their owners or creators, including in self-defense.
30 Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The
Effects of Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior
Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW 213–35 (Ryan Calo et al. eds.,
2016).
28
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I.

CROSSING THE DEFINITIONAL
THRESHOLD

Before we can get to the potentially fruitful subject of
considering family law analogies for robots, however, we
have to overcome a more basic definitional issue that still
bedevils much of the literature on the subject of robot law:
What is a robot?
A great variety of definitions have been offered.
The RoboLaw project co-funded by the European
Commission proposes the following answer to the question,
“What is a robot?”
According to the most widespread
understanding, a robot is an
autonomous machine able to
perform human actions. Three
complementary attributes emerge
from such a definition of robot:
They concern: 1) physical nature: it
is believed that a robot is unique
since it can displace itself in the
environment and carry out actions
in the physical world. Such a
distinctive capability is based on the
assumption that a robot must
possess a physical body. Indeed,
robots are usually referred to as
machines; 2) autonomy: in robotics
it means the capability of carrying
out an action on its own, namely,
without
human
intervention.
Autonomy is usually assumed to be
a key factor in qualifying a thing as
a “robot” or as “robotic”. In fact, in
almost all dictionaries definitions,
including authoritative sources
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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such as the International Standard
Organisation (ISO 13482), there is
always a reference to autonomy.
Finally, 3) human likeness: the
similarity to human beings. 31
(footnotes omitted).

This definition is indeed comprehensive, though
some may question whether “human likeness” is or should
be a central feature of the definition. Much of the
literature introduced earlier in this article addresses
technology systems that are not humanoid, or are AI
systems that do not have any physical manifestation at all.
Moreover, what “human likeness” means itself seems like
an entirely separate definitional problem fraught with
minefields.
More examples can be found in the 2016 book
Robot Law, which contains almost as many definitions of
robots as the number of chapters by its various
contributors.32 For example, Neil Richards and William
Smart propose:
“[a] robot is a constructed system
that displays both physical and
mental agency but is not alive in the
biological sense.”33

Another author in the same volume offers as the definition
of a social robot:

Erica Palmerini et al., Guidelines on Regulating Robotics 15 (2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.robolaw.eu/RoboLaw_files/
documents/robolaw_d6.2_guidelinesregulatingrobotics_20140922.pdf.
32 Neil Richards & William Smart, How Should the Law Think About
Robots?, in ROBOT LAW 3, 5–6 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).
33 Id. at 6.
31
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“A physically embodied autonomous
agent that communicates and
interacts with humans on a social
level.”34

Yet another describes a particular subcategory of robot—
a sexbot—as:
“a combination of existing artificial
(AI) technology, sensory perception
capabilities, synthetic physiological
responses, and affective computing.”35

Two other articles discuss the subject in terms that are
essentially inconsistent with these formulations, doing
away with the physical manifestation entirely and
focusing on the AI aspects of a robot. IBM’s Watson
supercomputer is referenced in the context of robot and
human expert disagreement,36 and another chapter does
so in the context of automated law enforcement.37
Writing from a Japanese perspective, Professor
Hirano Susumu suggests a robot can be defined as a
Darling, supra note 30, at 215.
Sinziana M. Gutiu, The Roboticization of Consent, in ROBOT LAW
186, 187 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).
36 Jason Millar & Ian Kerr, Delegation, Relinquishment and
Responsibility: The Prospect of Expert Robots, in ROBOT LAW 102,
117–24 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).
37 Lisa A. Shay et. al., Confronting Automated Law Enforcement, in
ROBOT LAW 235, 239 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016) (“We define
automated law enforcement as any computer-based system that uses
input from unattended sensors to algorithmically determine that a
crime has been, or is about to be, committed and then takes some
responsive action, such as to prevent the crime, to inform the
appropriate law-enforcement agency or to impose some form of
punishment.”).
34
35
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machine vested with a sense-think-act cycle. 38 He also
points out that as early as 2004, a Japanese government
study group of which he was a member had established a
definition of a robot as something which had sensors
enabling it to confirm its own status and that of the
external world as well as the capability to analyze the
information so obtained and to act accordingly.39
The European Parliament has called for the
creation of “a common European definition for smart
autonomous robots,” including appropriate subcategories,
taking into consideration:
1. the capacity to acquire autonomy through
sensors and/or by exchanging data with its
environment (inter-connectivity) and the
analysis of those data;
2. the capacity to learn through experience and
interaction;
3. the form of the robot’s physical support;
4. the capacity to adapt its behavior and actions
to the environment.40
Yet these considerations merely describe the scope of a
possible definition rather than serving as a functional one.
In one of his seminal works on the subject Ryan
Calo, one of the leading scholars in the field, has (probably
wisely) avoided defining a robot, while at the same time
characterizing them as an emergent technology that
combines “the genitive promiscuity of data with the
Hirano, supra note 2, at 55.
Id. at 67.
40 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL.
DOC. PV 14 (2015); Annex to the Motion for a Resolution: Detailed
Recommendations as to the Content of the Proposal Requested, EUR.
PARL. DOC. PV 14 (2015).
416
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capability to physical harm.” With this definition he
suggests that robotics represent a technology that is
exceptional enough to invite “a systemic changes to laws
or legal institutions,”41 which suggests that incremental
use of analogies from discrete fields of law may be
inadequate.
AI is certainly a factor in many definitions of
robots, with some authors even suggesting that “[w]e may
be misled if we insist on too sharp a distinction between
robotics and AI systems.”42 Others have simply defined AI
as a feature of what constitutes a robot without getting
into the details.43 Andrea Bertolini describes the quest for
a definition of a robot as “a pointless exercise.”44
Nothing in this article is intended as criticism of
these various definitions or their authors. Each definition
serves the purposes of the arguments and agendas being
advanced in the writings where they are used. They are,
however, academic, theoretical definitions. None seems
likely to serve as something that could be used in
connection with the development of coherent legal or
technical rules for actually regulating robots in the real
world. This would be for the simple reason that it would
Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
513, 553 (2015).
42 Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 45,
51 (June 2015).
43 See, e.g., Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of
Humans 4 (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 27/2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941001 (“. . . robots are a form of embodied
AI.”); Maxwell Mehlman, Jessica Wilen Berg, and Soumya Ray, Robot
Law 1 (Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-1, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2908488 (discussing the subject of robot
using the undefined term “artificially-intelligent robot.”).
44 Andrea Bertolini, Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic
Analysis of Robotic Applications and Liability Rules, 5 LAW,
INNOVATION & TECH. 214, 217 (2013).
41
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usually be unclear whether any particular robot would fit
whichever definition was being applied.
II.

PROBLEM AS SOLUTION: DEFINITION
AS A FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF
PRACTICAL ROBOT LAW

This article approaches the subject of robot law from a
different perspective: that a fundamental purpose of any
coherent system of practical robot law should be to provide
definitions that can be used as a framework for further
regulation to establish a framework for robotic identity.
Hard or soft laws defining what is and is not a robot would
be—should be—the starting point for either applying
existing rules to those definitions or developing new rules.
Whatever definitions this practical law of robots
provides will be unsatisfactory and incomplete; such is the
nature of legal definitions. Technology systems that have
many robot-like features, but are not “robots” under
whatever definitions we establish will invariably be
excluded. From the outset our system of robot law will
have to distinguish between those “robots” that fit the
legal definition and those that don’t.
This distinction will likely be a good and useful
thing. Why? Because this very basic definitional boundary
can be used to establish criteria for robots that make them
safer and the people who make, own, and use them more
responsible. Definitional rules can serve as a foundation
for encouraging the development and use of robots that fit
the definition and disfavor those that do not.
Let us look at family law again for examples. The
law accords numerous advantages—tax benefits,
inheritance rights, and testimonial privileges to family
relationships, particularly spousal ones.45 The same sorts
See, e.g. CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (1967); 26 U.S.C. § 2523 (2012); FLA.
418
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of rules could be developed to favor particular types of
robots: Fourth Amendment (or comparable) protections
could be accorded to sensitive video and voice recordings
stored in home companion robots, but only if they fit our
definition. Taxing robots (or their transactions) differently
depending on whether they fit our definition would be
another obvious possibility.
There are also analogies we could apply from other
areas of law. We could impose negligence liability for torts
caused by robots meeting our definition, and strict
liability on those caused by anything else.46 Who should
bear this liability is another question, but one for which
definition will at least help us develop answers.
Whether the examples given above would be
appropriate rules is open to debate. However, they should
at least illustrate why none of the definitions given above
would be particularly helpful in figuring out what sort of
rules to apply.
One simple way of establishing a definitional
“robot/not-robot” dichotomy (though the distinction need
not be dichotomous in practice), would be through a
registration system. Technology systems that are
registered in the system would be capital “R” Robots; those
that are not would be mere drones, Roombas, hobbyist
toys or other lower-case (and lower-caste) “robots.”
STAT. §§ 732.201–732.228 (2016).
46 Some may object that such rules would discourage innovation in
the “robot” space. See, Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571,
596–601 (2011) (discussing the implications of tort liability on robotic
innovation). Such objections will unlikely be supported by empirical
evidence, and more likely it will just mean innovation will take place
subject to a known, higher risk profile. In any case, to transpose what
parents say about fun to children brandishing pointy sticks, “it’s only
innovation until someone loses an eye.” The difference, of course, is
that with innovation in areas such as robots, the person losing the eye
is unlikely to be the person doing the innovation.
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The devil would be in the details, of course, and
much of the real definitional functioning of the rules
would come through the registration protocols. These
would be the technical, informational, legal and other
parameters that must be satisfied in order to register a
Robot (and maintain such registration), as well as the
rules
by
which
other
systems
(technological,
administrative or others) interact with that registry. This
subject will be addressed later.
Registering things as part of a system of rules is
hardly a new idea. Most readers will likely think of land,
motor vehicle, animal and corporate registries. However,
these may not be ideal cognates. Real estate does not move
and corporations don’t really exist. Robots do both. Motor
vehicles exist and move but usually only through human
agency (or product defects). As previously noted, most of
the “robots” discussed in the context of robot law are
expected to be capable of independent decisions and
motion, and are thus capable of taking actions that impact
the real world without any decisions or input from human
beings.
Similarly, many jurisdictions require dogs (and/or
other animals) to be registered. But everyone already
knows what a dog is, so it does not involve any definitional
complexity. By contrast, the definition of “robot” is a
fundamental issue, and one that a robot registration
system would (should!) seek to address.
Nor do existing registry systems offer a
comprehensive system of regulation or involve the high
level of technical sophistication that, given their nature,
should be a part of a robot registry system. Unregistered
automobiles can still be driven on roads and enter parking
structures, registration of land title does not itself prevent
trespass or adverse possession or identify who actually
does things on it.
420
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While registry systems may identify who owns or
is notionally responsible for whatever is registered, the
owner of a registered vehicle is unlikely to be responsible
if someone else has an accident while driving it, and
corporations seem to have evolved so as to deliberately
obfuscate who is actually responsible for most of its
behavior. In other words, other than corporate registries
which at least identify corporations as having a separate
legal status and notionally responsible directors, existing
registration systems do not address the issue of
independent agency or capacity, two of the key features of
robots that generate much of the discourse introduced
earlier in this article.
The European Parliament has recommended the
creation of a centrally-administered system of registration
for “smart robots” (whatever that means):
For the purposes of traceability
and in order to facilitate the
implementation
of
further
recommendations, a system of
registration of advanced robots
should be introduced, based on the
criteria
established
for
the
classification of robots. The system
of registration and the register
should be Union-wide, covering
the internal market, and could be
managed by a designated EU
Agency for Robotics and Artificial
Intelligence in case such an
Agency is created.47

This system is fine as far as it goes, but does it go far
47

Annex to the Motion for a Resolution, supra note 40.
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enough? It is not clear that this recommendation
envisions anything beyond something derived from
existing registration systems for corporations, vehicles, or
other forms of property. Nor does it indicate whether the
“criteria” for registration will be anything other than
broad guidelines.
Let us now return to a subject introduced earlier,
the potential for family law to provide a useful source of
rules that could be applied to robots. Here we should do so
in the context of the registration system. However, in the
common law system there is no comprehensive system of
registering families, only what might be called an eventbased system of certifying discrete family “transactions,”
that affect personal and family status: births, deaths,
marriages, divorces, adoptions and so forth.
Japan, however, has a well-established and
comprehensive system of family registration that may
offer a more useful model, one that that has been
functioning in the real world for over the century. The
next section will give a brief summary of the key aspects
of this system. It will also illustrate why the Japanese
system offers a number of useful possible analogies to use
in developing a system of robotic registration. Just as the
Japanese family registration system historically
functioned as part of the foundation of the civil law and
government infrastructure in Japan, a robotic registration
system could provide a similar foundational role for a
comprehensive system of robot law.48
This is also the appropriate juncture to point out that Japan has
its own literary “law of robots,” in the form of the Robot Law
introduced in Tetsuwan Atomu, the classic cartoon by Tezuka Osamu
and known in translation as “Astro Boy.” Roughly translated,
Tezuka’s law consists of the following rules: (1) robots may not hurt
or kill humans; (2) robots are born to serve humans; (3) robots can
make anything except money; (4) robots may not go abroad without
permission; (5) male and female robots may not interchange
48
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themselves; (6) robots may not change their own faces without
permission; (7) a robot created as a robot may not become a child
robot; (8) a robot dismantled by humans may not be put together by
another robot; (9) robots may not destroy human homes or property;
and (10) a robot must call the human who made it “father.” The
gendered and paternalistic aspects of these rules may seem quaint;
one should bear in mind that they appear in a fictional world
populated by robots in a children’s comic written decades ago.
Nonetheless, insofar as some of them are focused on robot identity,
the author would suggest they reflect a conceptualization of robot law
that is in some ways more relevant to real world than Asimov’s.
Tezuka Osamu, Aokish [The Blue Knight], 15 TETSUWAN ATOMU 7, 1516 (1981).
Outside the world of fictional Japanese robot law, in 2015 Keiż
University’s Professor Fumio Shinpo proposed eight precept of robot
law. Roughly summarized and translated, these were: (1) humanity
first (robots may not harm or become people); (2) obedience to order
(they must follow human orders and must be subject to control); (3)
secrecy and privacy (robots must preserve the secrecy of information
they gather and be designed accordingly, with reference to OECD
guidelines); (4) use limitation (robots must be limited to their
intended use and may not be used to harm humans); (5) security
safeguards; (6) openness & transparency (there must be visibility in
the design and use of robots); (7) individual participation (individuals
must participate in the creation of rules governing robots, and robots
must not govern individuals); and (8) accountability (there must be
rules of liability for harm caused by robots). Fumio Shinpo, Roboto hż
wo meguru hżryżiki betsu kadai no chżkan [A bird’s eye view of robot
law issues by legal field], 1 Jżhż hżsei kenkyƈ 64, 74-75 (2017). See
Colin P.A. Jones, Robot Rights: From Asimov to Tezuka, JAPAN TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2019/03/06/
issues/robot-rights-asimov-tezuka/#.XIFAy5NKiL8.
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III.

FAMILY LAW FOR OTHER PEOPLE:
JAPAN’S KOSEKI FAMILY
REGISTRATION SYSTEM

A. Overview
Japan’s system of formal family law can confound
Western observers who may be tempted to attribute its
functioning primarily to vague notions like “culture” or
“tradition.” In fact, all Japanese family law as exists today
only dates back as far as the Civil Code of 1896 which was
in fact heavily influenced by continental European models
at the time, and then further impacted by Americandriven amendments to the Code in 1947, during the postwar occupation.49 In many ways Japanese family customs
and norms of an older vintage were forced to fit into the
constraints of this more modern law.50
A more immediate explanation of why Japanese
family law seems strange and alien may be due to the
nation essentially having two interlinked systems of
family law: one public, and one private. What most people
associate with substantive family law—how people get
married, divorced, adopt, fight over estate and marital
property, decide custody of the children and so forth—can
be found in Part IV of the Civil Code (and Part V, as to
inheritance) and court practice. 51 To the extent it is
primarily concerned with the private law rights and
duties between persons within the context of family
See COLIN P.A. JONES & FRANK S. RAVITCH, THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM 29–38 (2018).
50 See Colin P.A. Jones, Japan’s Discriminatory Koseki Registry
System Looks Ever More Outdated, JAPAN TIMES (July 10, 2016),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2016/07/10/issues/japansdiscriminatory-koseki-registry-system-looks-ever-outdated/#.XEodg
_ZFxPY.
51 MINPŻ [CIV. C.] arts. 739–71, 859–82 (Japan).
49
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relationships, this system could be described as “family
law for family members.”
Most of the things people fight over in family
court—who the children live with, visitation, child
support and so forth—may seem important to those doing
the fighting, but for the most part do not (or should not)
affect the rights and duties of third parties. The universe
of changes in family status that potentially affect third
parties is not large: divorce which terminates spousal joint
liability for debts and terminates joint property rights, for
example, and post-divorce allocations of parental
authority is relevant to anyone who deals with a child
through the parent having it. Such changes do not
necessarily need to be accomplished through courts; the
principal requirement of third parties as to the family is
identifying who comprises it.
The second system of Japanese family law is thus
essentially “family law for everyone else.” In other words,
its primary purpose can be seen as to unambiguously
authenticate the existence (or absence) of those family
relationships that could potentially affect third parties,
whether through claims on property, the ability to
repudiate contracts made by other family members, joint
liability for debts, authority to deal on behalf of a minor
child and so forth.
This latter system of family law is based primarily
on a registration system known as the koseki—the Family
Register—and governed by the Family Register Act.52 On
a national level, the koseki system falls under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, but day-to-day
administration is left to municipal authorities.53
Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, translated in
(Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtrans
lation.go.jp (Japan).
53 Id. arts. 1–3.
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Article 6 of the Family Register Act illustrates the
basic purpose and parameters of the koseki system:
A family register shall be created
for each unit consisting of a
husband and wife, and any children
thereof with the same surname,
who have their registered domicile
within the area of a municipality;
provided, however, that when a new
family register is created for a
person who has entered into
marriage with a person who is not a
Japanese national (hereinafter
referred to as a "foreign national"),
or for a person who does not have a
spouse, it shall be created for each
unit consisting of such person and
any children thereof with the same
surname.54

This language illustrates two features of the koseki
system that make it a particularly useful model for a robot
registration system—a Robot Koseki.
First, just as what we have proposed should be a
basic feature of a system for robots, the koseki provides a
very basic and binary definitional framework based on
nationality. Only Japanese people have koseki
registrations. To be registered in a koseki means you are
Japanese. Japanese nationals have koseki registrations
and since Japanese nationality is transmitted through
parentage rather than place of birth (with some minor
exceptions), being registered in the koseki as the natural
child of a Japanese parent means you must also be
54

Id. art. 6.
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Japanese.55 Non-Japanese cannot register a koseki unless
they acquire Japanese citizenship through naturalization,
a process which requires abandoning other nationalities.56
On a very basic level, therefore, the system is
inherently binary, and makes it easy to create and
implement rules based on a simple Japanese/NotJapanese distinction. As is suggested by the latter half of
article 6 of the Family Register Act, Japanese family law
distinguishes in a basic different way in situations
involving foreigners, who only show up as marginal
notations in the koseki of a Japanese spouse or child. Some
might call this discrimination, but the starting point is
that foreign family members do not have koseki and
therefore must be treated differently.
With the appearance of the word “discrimination,”
it is important to be clear that nothing in this article is
intended to praise the koseki as part of a system of
regulating human families or discrimination. As the
discussion that follows will show it has (or, in prior
iterations had) numerous aspects that could be considered
deleterious to them. However, many of the features that
might make it seem an unsuitable system for some
humans, are precisely those features that would be
desirable in a system for robots. “Discrimination” is the
See Kokusekihż [Nationality Act], Law No. 147 of 1950, art. 2,
translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.
japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (Japan). More complex rules exist for
children born out of wedlock to Japanese fathers and non-Japanese
children adopted by Japanese parents. See id. arts. 3, 8 paras. (i)–(ii).
56 See id. arts. 5–9. Japan’s Nationality Act does not permit Japanese
adults to have dual nationality, and losing Japanese nationality
means removal from the koseki system. See id. arts. 11, 14. See also
Kosekihż Shikżkisoku [Ordinance for Enforcement of the Family
Register Act], Law No. 94 of 1947, art. 35(xii), art. 39(vii), translated
in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselaw
translation.go.jp (Japan).
55
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first such feature, since we want our system to favor and
encourage the development of and registration of robots
that satisfy the registration criteria, and discourage the
development of those that do not.
The second key feature of the Japanese koseki
illustrated by Article 6 of the Family Register Act is that
the basic unit of registration is the family rather than the
individual, making it fundamentally collective enterprise.
Under the Japanese system, the two events which render
the creation of a new koseki mandatory involve at least
two people: marriage or the birth of a child out of
wedlock. 57 The Civil Code requirement that legallymarried spouses share the same surname (which is
registered in the koseki) is similarly indicative of the role
of the koseki in treating a collective as a single unit.58
B. Historical Context
When it was first introduced shortly after the Meiji
Restoration of 1868 during a period when Japan had to
rapidly modernize in order to address the threat of
Western colonization, the koseki system performed a
number of important governance functions. Originally
tied to the location of the family residence, it operated as
57 See Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 6,
translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.
japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (Japan). Although it is possible for a
child who has reached adulthood to establish a registration separate
from his or her parents, this is not required and it is not uncommon
to remain on the parental koseki until marriage. Family Register Act,
art. 100.
58 See MINPŻ [CIV. C.] art. 750, (Japan) (requiring couples registering
a marriage to share the same surname, either the husband’s or the
wife’s). Article 790(1) imposes the same requirement as to children of
the marriage, id. art. 790, para. 1, while article 790(2) mandates a
child born out of wedlock take the surname of his/mother, id. art. 790,
para. 2.
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part of a surveillance system that facilitated keeping track
of who was from where and related to whom (this might
be a desirable functionality for a robot koseki system as
well).59
Registration systems had existed in Japan prior to
the Meiji Restoration but were localized within the
individual feudal domains that comprised the nation at
the time. Movement between these domains had been
tightly controlled. The breakdown of the social and
political order that characterized the years before the
Restoration saw numerous people leaving their domains
and effectively becoming untraceable.60
At the same time as this domestic unrest, Japan
faced the related threat of colonization by the foreign
powers who were coming to live and trade in Japan thanks
to the treaty rights wrested from Japan’s reluctant feudal
leaders by American Commodore Matthew Perry in 1954.
The introduction of a nationwide koseki system was thus
critical for a number of reasons, not only to forge a new
unified “Japanese” identity, but also to provide its new
national government basic demographic information
about the Japanese people. Such information was critical
to formulate and implement national policies such as
taxation and conscription.61
The initial koseki system adopted by the Meiji
For the discussion in this section I have relied heavily on the
wonderfully useful book by Professor Endż. See generally MASATAKA
ENDŻ, KOSEKI TO KOKUSEKI NO KINGENDAISHI: MINZOKU KETTŻ
NIHONJIN [A RECENT AND MODERN HISTORY OF FAMILY REGISTRATION
AND NATIONALITY] (2013). Those not able to read Japanese may find
Chapman and Krogness’ edited volume equally useful. See generally
DAVID CHAPMAN & KARL JAKOB KROGNESS, JAPAN’S HOUSEHOLD
REGISTRATION SYSTEM AND CITIZENSHIP: KOSEKI IDENTIFICATION AND
DOCUMENTATION (2014).
60 See, Endż, supra note 59 at 107–30.
61 Id.
59
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government was a failure and came to be replaced by the
system adopted in conjunction with the Civil Code of 1896,
which contained what became the basic rules of Japanese
family law. 62 The collectivist nature of the koseki was
more pronounced under this system until its reform
during the post-war occupation. “Families” under this
system might consist of three or four generations and
multiple married couples being registered in a single
koseki.
These families had a registered koshu or “head of
household.” This was a legal, heritable status
accompanied by numerous rights, authorities and duties,
including the duty to support members of the household,
a presumption in favor of family property being attributed
to him, the right to inherit and dispose of family property
and control entry into the family through approval of
marriages by junior members or acceptance into the
household of children born out of wedlock or members of
related households, and even the right to control where
members resided. 63 It was a status that could not be
freely shed by the person in whom it was vested, unless he
reached the age of 60 and there was a suitable successor
available and willing to assume his powers, at which point
he could retire.64
The head of household enabled the government to
effectively use the family, rather than the individual, as
the smallest unit of society subject to governance for many
purposes. In exchange for allowing heads of household
broad autonomy in how they managed their family, they
Id. at 125–230.
See Archive of Old Civil Code of Japan, arts. 735, 736, 747, 748, 749,
750, 955, 986, CORNELL UNIV. L. LIBRARY, https://archive.org/stream/
cu31924069576704/cu31924069576704_djvu.txt (last visited Mar. 7,
2018).
64 See id. arts. 752, 753.
62
63
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were responsible for helping implement policies such as
taxation and conscription.
A historical aspect of the system that is of
particular interest to our hypothetical robot registration
system is how the government encouraged—or forced—
people to register when it was introduced. As suggested
earlier in the article, this was accomplished by using laws
and regulations to create incentives to register and
disadvantages to failing to do so.
One noteworthy example was—and still is—
marriage and inheritance. Registration of a marriage was
and is an absolute requirement for the marriage to have
legal effect. Failure to register a marriage meant that the
children of the marriage were illegitimate. This was a
status to which the Civil Code accorded various
disadvantages, some of which remained into the twentyfirst century.65
Another example was through the linkage with
nationality. Not being registered in a koseki meant you
weren’t a member of the “Japanese people” (kokumin), and
thus not entitled to the privileges and protections that
came with that status. 66 The linkage of nationality to
65 However, in 2013, the Supreme Court ruled the provision
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because the Civil Code
(article 900) accorded lesser inheritance rights to children born out of
wedlock. See Saikż Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2013, 67 SAIKŻ
SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI MINJI HANREISHƇ [MINSHƇ] 1320.
66 As described by one of the leading authorities on the koseki, the
business of its introduction was “. . . a pivotal national policy: it was
by posting in the family register that the people [jinmin] were first
identified as “nationals” [kokumin] and those who were left out did
not enjoy the protection of the state, emphasizing their exile to outside
the scope of nationals, and attempting to crate enforceability of
registration in the family register.” (translation from Japanese by
Colin Jones). Endż, supra note 59, at 121 (2013). See also CHAPMAN,
supra note 59, at 146–65. Notwithstanding the numerous
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constitutional protection remains a part of Japanese law
today.67
Under the pre-1947 system, citizenship was also a
family affair. Marrying a Japanese person meant either
entering the Japanese spouse’s koseki and acquiring
Japanese nationality or leaving the koseki and losing it.68
Citizenship was also tied up with colonialism.
Japan’s acquisition of a colonial empire meant addressing
existing registry systems in Taiwan and Korea which
were based on very different systems of family law than
Japan.69 These were left in place and essentially the same
rules as applied to marrying foreigners applied: marrying
a Korean meant either the Japanese spouse either became
“Korean” (by the Japanese spouse entering the Korean
koseki) or the reverse. This system enabled colonial Japan
to develop different forms of citizenship within its empire
based on koseki registrations. Someone registered in a
disadvantages to not registering in the koseki, it is estimated that
every year approximately 3,000 children born in Japan are not
registered and may even reach adulthood while suffering the
tremendous
disadvantages
of
being
“bureaucratically,
administratively and legally invisible” for that reason. David
Chapman, The Invisible Japanese, EAST ASIA F. (Aug. 13, 2017),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/08/13/the-invisible-japanese/.
67 Note while not apparent from the English version of the
constitution, Chapter III of which enumerates the rights of “the
people,” the Japanese version uses the term “kokumin,” which clearly
refers to Japanese nationals. Japan’s Supreme Court has thus had to
develop jurisdiction as to the degree to which non-Japanese enjoy
constitutional protections. E.g., Saikż Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4,
1978, 32 SAIKŻ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHƇ [MINSHƇ] 1223. In a
2008 decision the Supreme Court of Japan confirmed that Japanese
citizenship is “an important legal status that means a lot to people in
order to enjoy the guarantee of fundamental human rights . . . .” Saikż
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 62 SAIKŻ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHƇ [MINSHƇ] 1367.
68 CHAPMAN, supra note 59, at 83.
69 Id. at 101-104.
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Korean koseki would not have the same freedom to come
to the Japanese islands or enjoy the same political rights
as someone registered in a Japanese koseki. 70 Again,
such a system would likely seem deplorable if applied to
humans today, but offers some possibly useful analogies
for how overlapping robotic registration systems could be
used.71
Another noteworthy historical aspect of the
system is that koseki records used to be essentially public
documents. From the 1890s the koseki system was
designed so that the family records of everyone were
accessible to other members of the general public (subject
to payment of the relevant fees).72 This was said to make
it possible to confirm that a contract counterparty was not
a minor or subject to other capacity restraints, a fiancée
was not married or to address a myriad of other situations
where it might be useful for one private person to confirm
the identity, status or family composition of another.73
It was not until 1976 that the first restrictions on
access to koseki records were imposed, with an
amendment to the Family Register Act prohibiting access
to koseki records for “improper purposes.” 74 2008
70 See id. at 228 (Japan’s former colonial subjects lost their Japanese
citizenship based on an interpretive directive from the MOJ stating
that those registered in Korean or Taiwanese registries at the time
the Treaty of San Francisco took effect in 1952 (and which stripped
Japan of its territories) would no longer be Japanese. This would have
included ethnic Japanese who married into Korean or Taiwanese
families, but excluded Koreans and Taiwanese who married into
Japanese ones).
71 See CHAPMAN, supra note 59, at 115-17 (for an extremely useful
description in Japanese of the colonial registration and nationality
systems of pre-war Japan).
72 Id. at 148-49.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 181, 184.
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amendments to the Family Register Act finally saw it
converted to a non-public system, with stringent
restrictions on third party access imposed for the first
time. 75 This came four years after Japan passed the
Personal Information Protection Act which essentially
recognized data privacy as a basic human right.76 Some
legal professions still have statutory rights to request
koseki information from the authorities if they have an
appropriate reason for doing so.77
One final historical note is that the koseki system
used to disclose more information about the registered
family and its individual members than it does now.
Information that was once recorded in the koseki includes
noble status, prior samurai status, birth out of wedlock,
being an abandoned child, birth or death in a sanatorium
or prison, roots in burakumin “untouchable” communities
and criminal records. 78 Until the 2000 amendments,
being subject to a declaration of incompetence or
guardianship was also recorded in the koseki.79
In short, therefore, the koseki system historically
enabled both the government and other third parties to
identify a unit known as the “family” and confirm its
Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, arts. 10, 102 (Japan).
76 Geren Ziliao Baohufa [Personal Information Protection Act], art. 1
(Japan).
77 CHAPMAN, supra note 59, at 181, 184.
78 Karl Jakob Krogness, Jus Koseki: Household Registration and
Japanese Citizenship, 12 ASIA PAC. J. JAPAN FOCUS 5-6, 8, 9, n.23
(2014) (reviewing CHAPMAN & KROGNESS, supra note 59).
79 See Tokyo Legal Affairs Bureau, (2015), http://houmukyoku.
moj.go.jp/tokyo/static/shoumei_mihon.html (stating that present
guardianship arrangements are registered in a separate registry
maintained by Legal Affairs Bureaus under the Ministry of Justice.
Instead of a koseki extract one can prove that one is not subject to any
capacity restraints through issuance of a “not being registered”
certificate from this Legal Affairs Bureau).
75
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members and various known legal attributes that accrued
to such status. Through the system it was possible to
confirm that someone was Japanese and who might be
responsible for the behavior of an individual family
member, or empowered to deal on the family’s behalf.
C. The Koseki System Today
The “head of household” status was inconsistent with the
equal protection guarantees and individualistic focus of
Japan’s postwar Constitution and was abolished during
the post-war occupation Civil Code reforms. 80 However,
the current system of family law and koseki registration is
still essentially collective. As already noted, new
registrations are triggered by marriage or births. 81
See e.g., ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A
PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK, 111-20 (1976); Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications (2017), http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/snews/110614_00001.html#kekkahoukou (reporting results of the
survey that reconsiders application procedures, with a focus on
procedures requiring the submission of family register extracts).
81 MINPŻ (CIV. C.) art. 750; JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 49, at 299300. See also Colin P.A. Jones, Japan’s Discriminatory Koseki
Registry System Looks Ever More Outdated, JAPAN TIMES (July 10,
2016), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2016/07/10/issues/ja
pans-discriminatory-koseki-registry-system-looks-ever-outdated/#.X
Eodg_ZFxPY; Mikihiko Wada, Abolition of the House (ie) Under the
Occupation – Or the Two Faces of Koseki: A Janus, 26 L. JAPAN 99,
104 (2000) (stating that many aspects of the current family law
system likely seem quirky and counterintuitive even to some
Japanese people. This is because it represents an occupation-era
compromise between the Americans overseeing the transformation of
Japanese laws and institutions and their Japanese government
counterparts. The Americans wanted an individual-based
registration system while the Japanese did not. The Americans
compromised in accepting a collectivist registration system, but only
so long as it did not permit registration of more than two generations
to be registered in it. This explains why women having a child out of
80
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Similarly, the Civil Code rules still theoretically make it
possible to attribute rights and responsibilities to family
members based on their registration status.
Today, births, deaths, disappearances, marriages,
divorces, adoptions (and their dissolutions), acquisition or
loss of Japanese nationality, legal name changes, formal
disinheritance of a presumptive heir, and changes of
gender are still recorded in the koseki.82 Other than birth
and death, of course, many changes of status—marriage,
consensual divorce, some adoptions and the consensual
dissolution of those adoptive relationships—and can be
accomplished merely by filing the necessary paperwork
with the local authorities. 83 Others—some (but not all)
adoptions of minors and changes of gender, for example—
require involvement of a family court but only in a
ministerial oversight role, with the result being registered
in the koseki.84
wedlock must separate herself from her parents’ registry, and why
whether a woman can return to her parents’ registry after the
termination of a marriage is dependent on whether she has parental
authority of the child of the marriage or not).
82 Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, arts. 20–4,
49–59, 66–69-2, 70–73-2, 76–77-2, 86–94, 97, 102–106, 107–107-2
(Japan).
83 For marriage: see MINPŻ (CIV. C.) art. 739 and Kosekihż [Family
Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 74, (Japan); for divorce: see
MINPŻ (CIV. C.) art. 764 and Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No.
224 of 1947, art. 76, (Japan); for adoptions: see MINPŻ (CIV. C.) art.
799 and Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1974, art. 66,
(Japan); for dissolution of adoption: see MINPŻ (CIV. C.) art. 812 and
Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1974, art. 70, (Japan).
84 MINPŻ (CIV. C.) arts. 798 and 817-2; Seidżitsu shżgaisha no
seibetsu no toriatukai no tokurei ni kansuru hżritsu [Act on Special
Cases in Handling Gender Status for Persons with Gender Identity
Disorder], Law No. 111 of 2003 (Japan). For example, same-sex
marriages are not currently recognized. Courts have developed wellestablished rules and practices for dealing with the rights of parties
in de facto marriages (for example), based on other provisions of the
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The koseki system makes Japan one of the easiest
countries in the world to get a mutually consensual
divorce; there is no residence requirement or need to go to
court—or even be in Japan.85 The divorce can be procured
merely by submitting a confirming divorce notification
with the registration authorities. Allocation of parental
authority over minor children to a single parent postdivorce is mandatory, but can also be accomplished simply
by filing the koseki paperwork. 86 Litigation over the
operation of the koseki system falls primarily into the
sphere of administrative law and involves issues such as
registry authorities refusing to accept registrations in
unusual situations, or parties challenging the registration
requirements.87
Civil Code such as those dealing with tort, contract and the Japanese
equivalent of equitable principles. Thus, such relationships don’t exist
outside the protections of the law; but they do exist outside of the
koseki system and are thus less significant to the rest of the world,
and are enjoying increasing recognition in the public sphere). See, e.g.
Sapporo First Major City in Japan to Issue Certificates Recognizing
Same-Sex Couples, JAPAN TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/01/national/sapporo-first-major-cityjapan-issue-certificates-recognizing-sex-couples/#.W2JefTn8lrQ
(showing that some municipalities have started to issue certificates
recognizing same-sex couples, though doing so has largely symbolic
value other than in connection with commercial services: “These
documents do not confer legal rights or obligations, but enable them
to become recipients of life insurance money and use family-member
discounts for mobile phone and other services.”).
85 Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1974, art. 40
(Japan) (allowing Japanese nationals living abroad to make koseki
filings through their local embassy or consulate).
86 MINPŻ (CIV. C.) art. 819(1); Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law
No. 224 of 1974, art. 76 (Japan).
87 Perhaps the most famous example is that of a parent who sought
to register his newborn child under the name of “devil” (akuma) and
brought suit when the register authority refused to accept it. Tokyo
Kateisaibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Jun. 1, 1994, Hachiouji Shibu, 1486
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The Civil Code and Family Register Act remain
closely interlinked, with the former providing the rules by
which people can enter into and terminate the
relationships registered in the latter. The family
relationships that can be reflected in the koseki are only
those provided for in the Civil Code. For changes in status
such as marriage, divorce, some adoptions, and the
dissolution of those adoptive relationships, registration is
what gives them legal effect. 88 Court resolution of
disputes that would affect a koseki registration and thus
third parties (e.g., divorce, dissolution of adoptive
relationships, changes in allocation of parental authority)
represent only a small subset of the matters family courts
deal with, and the court-sponsored conciliation process is
designed to filter out as many cases as possible before the
court must resolve any through formal litigation (which,
at risk of repetition, is not required in the first place).
Historically, around 90% of divorces have been
accomplished through koseki filings.89 The small minority
HANREI TAIMUZU 56 (Japan). See also Sam Jameson, In Japan,
Parents Play Devil's Advocate in Naming Child, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 15,
1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-01-15/news/mn-12064_1_boynamed-sue.
88 See, e.g., MINPŻ (CIV. C.) art. 739(1) (Japan) (“Marriage shall take
effect upon notification pursuant to the Family Registration Act. . . .”).
89 See MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE, OVERVIEW OF
VITAL STATISTICS (2017), https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/
jinkou/kakutei17/index.html (according to Japanese government
statistics, in 2015, 87.6% of divorces were achieved through koseki
filings and thus consensual. The remainder were resolved through
family courts, but even the majority of these through court-sponsored
conciliation or settlements. Only a little over 1% of divorces were
judicial divorces, with the change of status resulting from final
judicial action rather than the out of court agreement of parties. This
represents a slight decline from the previous decade, with consensual
divorces accounting for 87.8% of divorces in 2008, 91.2% in 1998, and
95.5% in 1950. Common lawyers accustomed to a system where even
consensual divorces must be accomplished through court proceedings
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of cases in which the courts play any role are resolved
through conciliation; only about 1% of Japanese divorces
are the result of judicial action.90
The koseki also functions in a code-like fashion in
that it prevents prohibited changes of status from
occurring in the first place through the parameters built
into the system. Bigamy is a crime in Japan, 91 but it is
also one that is almost impossible for Japanese people to
commit since registry authorities would not accept a
marriage registration filed by a couple whose koseki
records showed one of them still married to someone else.
The same is true of other prohibitions on marriage.92 This
aspect of the system has caused problems in specific cases,
including transgender individuals seeking to register
themselves as the fathers of children born using donor
sperm when their registry reveals them to originally have
been registered as female,93 biological parents seeking to
register children born to surrogate mothers abroad,94 and
mothers or children seeking to use DNA evidence to rebut
the presumptions of paternity imposed by the Civil Code
(article 772) that would result in children being born
are particularly likely to find a discussion of Japanese family law that
focuses on what Japanese courts do may thus find the system both
familiar yet alien).
90 Id.
91 KEIHŻ [PEN. C.], art. 184 (Japan). Bigamy is also proscribed by
MINPŻ (CIV. C.), art. 732 (Japan).
92 MINPŻ (CIV. C.), arts. 731, 733(1), 734–736, (Japan) (including
marriages by men under 18 or women under 16, marriages to family
members (including adoptive) within a certain degree of affinity, and
marriages by women within 100 days of the dissolution of a prior
marriage).
93 Saikż Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 10, 2013, no. 5, 67 SAIKŻ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHƇ [MINSHƇ] 1847 (Japan).
94 Saikż Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 23, 2007, no. 47, 61 SAIKŻ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHƇ [MINSHƇ] 619 (Japan).
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during or even after a marriage being registered as the
child of the husband.95
Similarly, the koseki maintains its own integrity
by rejecting filings that do not satisfy its requirements.
For example, the form used to report births for
registration in the koseki must still be filed with a
denotation of whether the child was born in or out of
wedlock. In 2013 the Supreme Court upheld a registry
authority’s rejection of a registration from parents who
refused to check the relevant box on the reporting form.96
D. The Attributes and Uses
Registration Information

of

Koseki

The rules of these two interlocked systems of family law
are unambiguous and often binary in a computer code-like
fashion. Parties are legally married or they aren’t. Having
an elaborate wedding ceremony in front of a crowd of
friends and family, exchanging marital vows before a
suitable religious figure, and even having children may
give rise to rights and liabilities under tort or contract,
and possibly even recognition as a de facto marriage for
the purpose of some benefits programs, but will never be
a legal marriage unless it is registered in the koseki.97
95 This result was achieved through a trio of judgments issued on the
same date by the same petty bench. SAIKO SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.], 1st
Petty Bench, Jul. 17, 2014, 61 SAIKŻ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHƇ
619 (no case reporter citation); SAIKO SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.], 1st Petty
Bench, Jul. 17, 2014, 247 SAIKŻ SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHƇ MINJI 79; and
SAIKO SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.], 1st Petty Bench, Jul. 17, 2014, 68 SAIKŻ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHƇ 547. For a discussion, see Shigenori
Matsui, Never Had a Choice and Have No Power to Alter: Illegitimate
Children and the Supreme Court of Japan, 44 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
577, n.46 (2016).
96 Saikż Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 26, 2013, no. 399, 67 SAIKŻ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHƇ [MINSHƇ] 1384 (Japan).
97 See, e.g., Colin P.A. Jones, Japan’s Discriminatory Koseki Registry
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Rigid rules also apply to other family members
and their registration. Children are born out of wedlock or
they are not. Children born within 200 days of and
thereafter during the marriage are presumed (and
registered as) the child of the husband, as are children
born within 300 days of its termination, regardless of what
DNA tests reveal. 98 Children’s names must be derived
from the government-approved set of ideographs.99 Lineal
System Looks Even More Outdated, JAPAN TIMES (July 10, 2016),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2016/07/10/issues/japansdiscriminatory-koseki-registry-system-looks-ever-outdated/#.WzWv4
fX8lrQ (since, as in other countries, marriages were entered into on
the assumption they would result in children, it became a common
practice to have a wedding ceremony but defer actual registration of
the marriage until the wife became pregnant. This practice survived
well into the post-war period, as is illustrated by the 1966 crash of an
All Nippon Airways flight from Osaka to Matsuyama which resulted
in the death of all on board. The dead included 12 newlywed couples
embarking on what had become the newly-fashionable custom of
taking a honeymoon. However, it transpired that not a single one of
the marriages had been registered, meaning that there was no legal
family relationship between them, a fact that reportedly made
compensation negotiations with the airline more complicated).
98 See Colin P.A. Jones, Nineteenth Century Rules Over Twenty-First
Century Reality: Legal Parentage Under Japanese Law, 49 FAMILY L.
QUART. 149, 159-66 (2015) (discussing a trio of 2014 cases the
Supreme Court of Japan rejected efforts by mothers and children to
use conclusive DNA evidence to rebut paternity over the objections of
ex- or estranged husbands). See also MINPŻ (CIV. C.), art. 772 (Japan)
(stating only the husband has the statutory authority to rebut the
presumption of paternity of children and must do so within one year
of knowing of the child’s birth); MINPŻ (CIV. C.), arts. 774 & 777
(Japan).
99 Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 50, para.
1 (Japan) (“For the given name of a child, characters that are simple
and in common use shall be used.”); Kosekihż [Family Register Act],
Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 50, para. 2 (Japan) (“The scope of characters
that are simple and in common use shall be defined by Ordinance of
the Ministry of Justice.”).
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relatives by blood and siblings within a degree of affinity
defined through the koseki have a statutory duty of
mutual support,100 and so forth.
The rigidity of the Civil Code rules means that, for
example, the locus of legal parental authority over (and
thus responsibility for) a minor child is never ambiguous
and can be verified through the koseki. Parental authority
over children born out of wedlock vests in the mother by
default. 101 Children of married parents are under the
joint parental authority of both parents, and a provision
of the Civil Code specifically protects third parties from
conflicting exercises of such authority. 102 After divorce
only one parent is allowed to have parental authority.103
Those identified as having parental authority are
presumptively authorized to deal on the child’s behalf,
permit the child to work, manage his or her property as
well as having responsibility over care and education, 104
or even exercise parental authority over the children of
the child 105 (the age of majority currently being 20). 106
100 MINPŻ (CIV. C.), art. 877, para. 1 (Japan). See also MINPŻ (CIV. C.),
art. 877, para. 2 (Japan) (if special circumstances apply this duty can
be extended by a family court to the third degree of affinity, which
again would be demonstrated through koseki records).
101 MINPŻ (CIV. C.), art. 819, para. 4 (Japan).
102 MINPŻ (CIV. C.), art. 825 (Japan).
103 MINPŻ (CIV. C.), art. 819, paras.1–2 (Japan).
104 See, e.g., MINPŻ (CIV. C.), arts. 820, 821, 823, 824 (Japan).
105 See MINPŻ (CIV. C.), art. 833 (Japan) (another interesting area
that does not seem to have been discussed in the robot law literature
is who should be responsible for robots created by robots; here too
family law may offer a useful source of analogies).
106 MINPŻ (CIV. C.), art. 4 (Japan). At the time of writing, the Diet had
passed a law to reduce the age of majority to 18 for certain purposes.
See Japan’s Government Approves Bill that Would Lower Age of
Adulthood from 18 to 20, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/13/national/japans-gover
nment-approves-bill-lower-age-adulthood-18-20.
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The rules for attributing tort liability for minors are more
complicated, but the locus of parental authority serve as a
starting point.107
The binary and unambiguous nature of the family
relationships reflected in the koseki means that that an
extract of a person’s koseki will usually suffice as proof of
family relationships that are relevant to third parties. For
a small fee the appropriate municipal authority can issue
an extract that serves as up-to-date official proof of a
person’s personal identity (legal name, gender, date of
birth, etc.) or a more extensive one showing parentage,
marital status and children. A translation of a koseki
extract is given later in this article and illustrates the
principal data fields it contains. The koseki system thus
plays a key role in not only authenticating identity and
status of the family registered in it and its constituent
components, but the legal rights and duties that come
with registration of the family unit and its individual
components. The utility of a registry of robots that
authenticates key attributes of robotic identity is
hopefully obvious.
Because it is a unified system and registration of
most changes in status is what gives them legal effect, a
koseki extract will show an up-to-date snapshot of the
legal status of a family that is superior to the “event-based”
documentation (e.g., birth certificates, marriage
certificates and divorce decrees) used in places like the
United States. An American may be able to use a marriage
certificate to prove they married a certain person on a
certain date in the past, but would struggle to positively
prove they were still married to that person today. Such
MINPŻ (CIV. C.), arts. 712–714 (Japan) (providing the basic rules
regarding liability for the torts of children and others lacking capacity
and of those obligated to supervise them).
107
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proof would be possible through a koseki extract.108
A copy of the translation of a full family register
extract that is made available on the US Embassy &
Consulates in Japan website has been provided on the
following page for reference.109
The system is also superior in also only providing that information
about the legal status of the family relationship that third parties
need to know; the status itself. The American practice of using divorce
or custody decrees as proof of custody rights means that schools,
passport authorities and other third parties may be routinely
receiving court documents full of information about the terms of a
divorce or separation that are irrelevant for their purposes.
109 Translation Templates, AM. EMBASSY & CONSULATES IN JAPAN,
https://jp.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/passports/translationtemplates/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
108
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An explanation of some of these data fields is necessary.
First, “Permanent Domicile” is a misleading translation of
the Japanese term honseki. The koseki originally tied the
family registered to it to a geographical locus—the
ancestral home, for example. This is no longer the case, if
it ever was in reality. As already noted, the actual
residential arrangements are reflected in a separate
residence registry, which is becoming more important as
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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a framework for law and government programs, and may
actually be more reflective of real (as opposed to legal)
family life for a particular household. 110 While each
koseki is still tied to a geographic location which, among
other things, identifies the municipality responsible for its
administration, it does not need to be the place where one
resides or even a location physically capable of serving as
a residence.111 It is also possible to change the location of
one’s honseki to another location, though this will be
reflected in the current koseki record, enabling one to
track back through prior registrations.112
Second, the “householder” (hittżsha) is a remnant
of the “head of household” concept and reflects the
principal that all (Japanese) members of the household
registered in the koseki must share the same legal
surname. The householder data field identifies the person
whose surname is to be shared. This must be decided at
the time of marriage, and is a requirement framed in
gender neutral terms but in 98% of marriages the wife
The residence registry is also nationality-neutral in that it also
includes non-Japanese with residence status. Until 2012, nonJapanese residents were registered in a separate “alien registration”
system. See JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 49, at 304; see also Atsushi
Kodera, Foreigners Urged to Swap Alien Certificates for New Cards
by July Deadline, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/25/national/foreigners-urged-to-swapalien-certificates-for-new-cards-by-july-deadline/.
111 See JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 49 (noting that one of the
author’s children are presently registered with their Japanese mother
at their Japanese grandparent’s home, which results in their koseki –
and Japanese passports - showing their “domicile” (honseki) as being
a location in Japan where they have never actually lived and that
hundreds of people reportedly register their honseki at Tokyo
Disneyland and the famous Kżshien baseball stadium).
112 Some Japanese persons may be reluctant to change their koseki
location since it may create the appearance that they “have something
to hide.”
110
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takes the husband’s surname.
The remaining data fields are probably selfexplanatory, and would show the names and other
pertinent details of other members of the family (spouse
and children, both natural and adopted) registered in the
koseki as well as parents, making it possible to track back
through the ancestry of both parties.
The above reflects the “standard” full koseki
extract. It is also possible to procure an extract showing
the pertinent details of just an individual member. For
inheritance or other purposes, it may also be necessary to
obtain an extract of a koseki that no longer is “active”
(because all its members have either died or moved to
other koseki) or of older koseki records that predate their
reformatting from paper-based to computerized systems
and other changes based on change of law.113
Unlike family law in the United States, the system
is not dependent on judicial decisions. Even in the
minority of cases where a change in status is accomplished
through litigation, that result is simply reflected in the
koseki. This has a number of important ramifications that
may not be immediately obvious to an American lawyer.114
113 See About "Statutory Inheritance Information Certification
System" MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji05_
00284.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (in 2017 the Ministry of Justice
introduced a “proof of legal heirs” certification that obviated the need
for heirs to go to title registries clutching a pile of koseki extracts in
order to retitle a decedent’s property. The certification is still based
on information derived from the decedent’s koseki records).
114 Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 116 para.
1 (Japan) (stating Japan’s Civil Code contains a procedure for
recognition of foreign judgments); MINJI SOSHŻHŻ [C. CIV. PRO.] 1896,
art. 118. In the author’s experience, common law judges and lawyers
dealing with Japan-related family disputes spend an inordinate
amount of time wondering about whether a divorce or custody decree
from their jurisdiction will be “recognized” in Japan. This may be an
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It means the system is freed of the constraints of
jurisdiction or even geography: Japanese people can get
married or divorced for Japanese law (koseki) purposes
from anywhere in the world by filings through their local
consulate.115 It also means documents produced by courts
are not generally needed as proof of status, since
authentication is established through a unified registry
system. It also means the extracts generated by the
system are standardized as to format and content, as
opposed to American-style divorce or custody decrees
which may vary by court or judge and include case-specific
details and orders.
At the risk of trying to sound trendy, the koseki
system also has a “blockchain”-like feature: each koseki
record traces back to a previous koseki record. This
includes previous registrations in different locations, but
also those of parents and children. The koseki thus
establishes a clear “chain of title” in family
relationships.116 A set of koseki records dating back to a
decedent’s birth can be used to show that all possible legal
heirs are present and accounted for; if they all agree to a
particular disposition of the decedent’s property it is
important question when it comes to property and other obligations,
but since the koseki system means that court decrees are never used
as proof of status—particularly parental authority/legal custody—the
way they are in common law systems, it may not be as important a
consideration as they expect. For a Japanese person, the most basic
issue of a foreign judgment may be whether it will be accepted by
koseki authorities for purposes of registering a divorce or other change
of family status achieved abroad. In the first place this will be a
matter of administrative law and will likely only involve the courts if
the registry authorities refuse to accept a foreign court order on public
policy grounds.
115 Kosekihż [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 40
(Japan).
116 Mikihiko Wada, Abolition of the House (ie) Under the Occupation—
Or the Two Faces of Koseki: A Janus, 26 L. JAPAN 99, 104 (2000).
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possible to liquidate bank accounts or re-title land without
probate or other court proceedings. Similar functionality
would doubtless be desirable in a robot registration
system.
E. Summary
The rigidity, discriminatory foundations, and invasions of
privacy inherent in the koseki system may seem shocking
to Western readers. Many Japanese people may also
regard the rules of the Civil Code and the koseki system
itself as rigid and outdated, particularly the presumptions
of paternity embedded into both systems which literally
date back to the nineteenth century and continue to
bedevil families today.117
However, at risk of repetition, the purpose of this
article is not to praise the koseki system specifically or
offer Japanese family law as a model for regulating
humans. 118 Rather, its goal is to identify some of the
features of the past and present koseki system which may
prove useful in developing family law analogies for the
regulation of robots.
First, the koseki identifies who is and is not a
member of legally-significant group (Japanese/NotJapanese). Second, it treats (or treated) families as a
single unit for some regulatory purposes, but one in which
further rules can be used to allocate rights and
responsibilities among members constituting—involved
See, e.g., Colin P.A. Jones, Nineteenth Century Rules over TwentyFirst Century Reality–Legal Parentage under Japanese Law, 49
FAMILY L. Q. 149, 149 (2015) (suggesting that Japanese courts are
struggling to reconcile centuries-old statutory presumptions with
advances in biomedical technology as well as the changing realities of
Japanese family life).
118 See Jones, supra note 50.
117
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in the creation of—the registered family unit (husband,
wife and child; head of household in the past). Third, it
provides a means by which external parties can
authenticate the legal attributes—the identity—of the
family and its members that are potentially relevant to
deciding how and whether to interact with it. Fourth, it
provides or provided a means of identifying responsibility
for the actions of members of the collective, particularly
where limited capacity is an issue (children, adults
adjudicated incompetent). Fifth, it provides a basic source
of demographic information about family populations.
Sixth, it establishes a framework for developing numerous
other rules, regulations, and policies based on the
relationships and data reflected in the koseki data fields.
Seventh, these other rules can be used to reinforce the
system by according benefits to registration and
disadvantages to not registering. Eighth, the system is
flexible in that it can be adjusted to add or remove
attributes that should be registered or are no longer
necessary, as well as the manner in which they are
expressed in the registration system. Ninth, in the past,
the koseki was an open-access system that provided a
useful reference to anyone considering interactions with a
particular family or family member. Tenth, the system
functions in a code-like fashion in preventing legally
prohibited “transactions” such as bigamy from occurring
in the first place. Finally, it helps maintain its own
integrity and usefulness by prohibiting registrations that
do not include the required information in the required
format.
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IV.

WHAT WOULD A ROBOT
SYSTEM LOOK LIKE?

KOSEKI

We can now return to the subject of regulating robots and
how it could be informed by the koseki system. Of course
the koseki system does not provide a perfect analogy. It
registers as a single unit a family comprised of multiple
separate actors each capable of independent agency and
action. Robots, whether registered are not, will generally
be single units behaving as sole actors, but with multiple
other parties (programmers, manufacturers, owners, etc.)
who are essentially passive but potentially have rights or
liabilities attributable to its acts. Nonetheless, the author
believes that the legal aspects of the parent-child
relationship in particular, as well as other family
relationships that can be confirmed through the koseki
system, provide a very useful basic source of analogies for
robot regulation. The remainder of this article will be
devoted to some preliminary speculation and suggestions
about what a Robot Koseki might look like.
A. Definitional Attributes
First, as indicated at the outset, one of the most important
functions of the Robot Koseki would be definitional. Just
as the Japanese koseki system defines who is Japanese
and who is not, the Robot Koseki would divide the world
into registered Robots and unregistered technology
systems. This latter universe might include systems that
have many attributes commonly associated with “robots.”
However, they would not be Robots for purposes of the
registration system, or the rules and regulations tied to it.
In fact, the only difference between two otherwise
identical technology systems might be that one is
registered in the Robot Koseki as Robot and the other is
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not. This difference could be—should be—quite significant
not only for legal purposes but, as discussed below, for
practical reasons relating to the comparative utility of the
registered Robot over the unregistered technology system.
The definitional function of the Robot Koseki does
not need to be entirely binary. Within the universe of
registered Robots, it would be possible to provide for
various sub-categories of Robot that could have differing
attributes and registration criteria. These could be used
for purposes of applying additional technical
requirements within the registration parameters, or
imposing external class-specific rules. Some of the
existing literature on the regulation of specific types of
robots and introduced earlier on this article suggest that
sub-categories might be based on the task the robots
perform (service, transportation, etc.), the environment in
which it operates or should be limited to (water, spare, air,
land, inside, outside), the manner in which the robot
“manifests itself” or exists (embodied physical robots, or
primarily virtual ones), the manner in which the robot
interacts with humans, or the degree of autonomy it will
have.119
Whether there are sub-categories of registered
Robots, a key aspect of the system will be in providing a
de facto definition of non-Robots. This will enable the
system to be used as a framework for developing
additional rules that discriminate against unregistered
robots by according increasing benefits and advantages to
the creation and use of Robots that are registered, and
disadvantages to the creation and use of those that are not.
The merits and demerits of registration would be both
legal and technological, the latter possibly developing in
the form of greater network accessibility and
See Palmerini, supra note 31, at 7 (stating that some of the
categories anticipated are mentioned).
119
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interoperability with other technology systems. The use of
this definitional function in conjunction with suitable
registration parameters would have significant social and
commercial utility in associating registered Robots with
safety and an identifiable nexus of liability.
B. Registration Parameters and Criteria
The registration parameters and criteria—the data fields
that need to be filled in a Japanese koseki offer some
analogies—would themselves form part of the regulatory
foundation of the Robot Koseki system. Only robots
satisfying the parameters would be eligible for
registration. This would be part of the system’s merit:
being a registered Robot would provide third parties with
assurances that it satisfies certain minimum standards as
to technical specifications, safety, information, possible
liability nexuses, and so forth. Hard and soft law
requirements as well as technical rules and regulations
can then be built by governments and private actors based
on these standards.
What these parameters should be is a matter for
further consideration. Some may be optional and others
mandatory. In general terms, however, they can be
assumed to be primarily technological and informational.
These subjects are developed further below.
C. The Robot Koseki as a Technology-Based
System
Unlike the Japanese koseki system, which was originally
based on paper ledgers, the Robot Koseki would be based
on modern technology, rooted in code, hardware, and
network systems. The technological aspects of the system
would dictate some of the registration criteria—the
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technical specifications—that a robot would have to
satisfy in order to be registered.
A detailed discussion of those parameters is a
subject for another time and probably a more technically
astute author. However it is easy to envisage that it would
include requirements and specifications such as those
relating to: (i) the method the Robot uses to interact with
other technology systems (WiFi, USB, QR codes,
Bluetooth, RFID, etc.); (ii) basic safety parameters as to
size, speed of motility, etc.; (iii) location (e.g., incorporation
of GPS; compatibility with geo-fencing systems, etc.); (iv)
cybersecurity requirements (anti-malware/ requirements,
etc.); (v) access requirements (i.e., if the Robot Koseki
system requires Robots to submit to software updates for
various purposes, the Robot will have to be set to accept
such updates regularly); (vi) privacy protection (e.g.,
mandatory data encryption and access restrictions for
video, voice, and other data recorded by the Robot); (vii)
operating system; (viii) override capability (e.g., a kill
switch that can be used remotely to shut the Robot down
remotely when necessary in emergency situations);120 (ix)
sensory capabilities for perceiving the world (video, sound,
motion sensors, facial recognition technology, etc.); and (x)
For those who actually worry about such things, this could include
the doomsday scenario depicted in the Terminator movie series in
which an AI becomes self-aware and uses robots to try to destroy
humanity. As noted by Marchant and Stevens, some people
apparently do worry about such things, since the European
Parliament has passed resolutions requiring robot designers to
include a kill switch to deactivate the robot if it is causing problems.
Gary E. Marchant & Yvonne A. Stevens, Resilience: A New Tool in the
Risk Governance Toolbox for Emerging Technologies, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 233, 270 (2017) (citing Resolution of 16 Feb. 2017 with
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics,
EUR. PARL. DOC. (2015/2103(INL)) (2017) (requiring that designers of
robots “integrate obvious opt-out mechanisms (kill switches) that
should be consistent with reasonable design objectives”)).
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a “black box” that records all that is happening inside the
Robot (software updates, a log of what and how the robot
may have “learned” to do things etc.), and which can be
used for forensic purposes, if necessary. Further
mechanisms may be necessary to (for example) address
the safety, integrity and rights (or denial) of access to the
vast amount of data robots may be able to record and store.
Roboticists will doubtless have other suggestions as to
what technological parameters should be included.
D. Informational Parameters:
Robotic Identity

Creating

a

Registration systems are essentially informational, and
the Robot Koseki would be no different. First, just as cars,
mobile phones, and numerous other technological devices
have unique identifying codes, Robots registered in the
system would also be assigned unique identifying codes or
numbers that would become a key part of its identity.
Codes identifying members of the same series or
production line of robots could also be used. Robot
Identification Numbers could even serve as taxpayer
identification numbers if the Robot is accorded legal
personality and the ability to engage in revenueproducing activities.
The Robot Koseki would presumably also require
various technical information about the Robot to be
included as part of its registration details—operating
system, whether it contain a camera, recording devices,
the nature of its power source and so forth. Some of this
information would be necessary to confirm whether the
Robot is eligible for registration in the first place, but
others might be optional but useful for other persons and
technology systems trying to ascertain whether they
should interact with a particular Robot.
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Notwithstanding the technical aspects of Robots
and our proposed Robot Koseki, it must be remembered
the goal is to have a registry that facilitates the
development and use of Robots compatible with and
amenable to regulation and enforcement outside of the
sphere of technology, including through the “traditional”
legal system.
For this reason, some of the key registration
parameters should provide information about people
involved in the creation and ongoing existence of the Robot,
people who through the system will effectively become a
part of the Robot’s identity. This is where the Japanese
koseki system provides a particularly useful model, since
it involves the registration of a single unit (the family)
that is comprised of multiple constituents. If we are to
develop robot law from family law analogies and attempt
to regulate Robots as a form of “perpetual children,” then
the koseki system will make it possible to identify who is
analogous to their parent(s).
Thus, the mandatory registration criteria for a
Robot should include identification of certain categories of
persons. Whether such persons can include corporations
is a question for further consideration; if a key goal of the
system is to ensure a nexus of responsibility for robotic
behavior is always identifiable, this goal may not be best
served if some or all of these informational requirements
can be satisfied through the use of artificial entities
(corporations) whose core utility lies in their ability to
obfuscate and limit liability (which is, after all, a synonym
for “responsibility”). As for the categories of persons that
should be included in the registration details, some that
seem obvious to someone writing in the year 2019 are:
maker (or manufacturer), programmer, owner, and user.
Who should be named in these categories may not
be as difficult as one may first imagine. “Maker” would
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most easily be a large company engaged in the mass
production of consumer robots, like Japan’s Pepper or
Aibo—a manufacturer. On the other side of the spectrum
would be hobbyists or inventors creating their own robots,
out of individual components or kits. There should not be
any impediment to the latter category registering as well,
and the system should require them to know enough about
the construction of the robot they are making in order to
do so.
Defining “programmer” may be more complicated.
Or maybe not: mass-produced consumer robots will likely
have standard software that is attributable to a particular
vendor. But other robots may be empty shells that can be
programmed by the owner or third parties (or even other
robots). Other robots may rely on open-source or crowdsourced software that is not easily attributable to a
particular individual or entity. Some may sit empty until
“occupied” by an AI “presence” through a network
connection, here again attribution of the source of the
programming may be difficult. But perhaps this should
not matter; for purposes of the registration system it may
not be as important to identify the source or sources of the
code that gives the robot life, but who is presumptively
responsible for allowing it to do so. In this sense, perhaps
the correct term is not “programmer” but “gatekeeper.”
Default rules may be possible; for example, the
manufacturer could be responsible for programming, or
even just “programmability,” unless the owner or some
other party changes the software, in which case the
burden of proof as to the absence of liability could shift to
that person.
“Owner” would seem to be a fairly obvious
category of required information and one that most robot
owners would likely want to make clear. “User” may not
be necessary, but it is easy to envision a future where
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robots are rented out for short periods or lease-financed
for extended periods by people unwilling or unable to
make capital investments in expensive robots. In fact,
depending on how it is implemented, the Robot Koseki
could also simultaneously serve as or augment platforms
for buying, selling or renting out robots, perhaps even
combined with a digital currency.
The system would of course need to be capable of
promptly reflecting changes in the information about at
least some of the persons comprising a Robot’s identity—
in much the same way that marriages, divorces and other
changes in personal status are reflected in the koseki, or
changes in title of registered property. Like cars a Robot
might go through several owners. Just as the Japanese
koseki system fails to reflect the realities of family life—a
couple registered as husband and wife may be long
estranged and living apart with new partners—the Robot
Koseki may not always be up to date as to who is actually
the owner, user, or programmer of a Robot at any given
time. However, both technical and legal incentives can be
built into the system to encourage registration of changes.
Liability for a robot should remain with the registered
person or persons unless a change in status is also
registered. Again, part of the system’s value broader value
would be its function as a reliable source of information
about robotic identity for innocent third parties.
While it might seem unfair to hold a registered
owner responsible for harm caused by a robot that has
been stolen, hijacked, or hacked, the harshness of default
rules such as “the owner is responsible” can be mitigated
through other rules allowing for a shifting of the burden
of proof once evidence of hacking or theft is introduced. In
any case, it is these informational aspects of the system
that may prove most important, since that is how more
general rules of robotic law can be developed, either
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through the existing rules of law such as products liability
or the creation of new ones that attribute robot behavior
to identified categories of people.
The author believes that many of the issues raised
at the beginning of this article can be resolved through the
development of rules based on the criteria and parameters
of a registration system: who is responsible for harm
caused by the Robot, who enjoys the fruits of its labors,
who is entitled to assert privacy rights in the data it
gathers and so forth can all be tied to a small universe of
possible persons identifiable through the registration
system, and so forth. Further rules can be developed as
between this possible universe through contracts. Clarity
as to who is liable for the robot will facilitate the
development of standard robot insurance products. In fact,
a digital certificate of insurance coverage could be one of
the registration parameters, either optional or mandatory.
These are the easy, specific examples already
receiving the attention of those who debate robot law and
introduced earlier in this article. Yet there are doubtless
numerous other areas where a framework that clearly
identifies a limited universe of possible obligors or
claimants will be useful.
Let us take the rules of possession in the law of
property as an example. Say a shopping mall security
robot finds a dropped wallet; it picks it up and proceeds
towards the mall office. A passer-by grabs it from the
Robot and starts to walk away. In this example there may
well be an interesting bar-exam type question along the
lines of “what crime has been committed, if any?”
But before we can answer that question, we should
be able to define who, if anyone, is able to claim possession
of the wallet once the robot has picked it up. Is the robot
acting as agent for someone, and if so who? The mall’s
owner? The robot’s owner (it could be provided by a
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management company)? The wallet’s yet-to-be-identified
owner?
This article will not offer an answer. However, the
example hopefully illustrates how it would be useful to
have rules that facilitate attributing physical possession
(or an agency relationship) to an identifiable person
associated with the robot. A registration system with
suitable information parameters would make it possible
to develop simple rules of broad applicability that would
quickly be comprehensible to the population at large.
While the system will facilitate the development of new
rules and laws that take into account the special nature of
robots, it will also facilitate applying existing rules of law
with necessary modifications or through judicial
precedent. As with possession, well-established rules
about the creation, attribution and ownership of new
property (including intellectual property) can also be
developed through the registry system. To the extent
robots are capable of harming other people or their
property, the system can be used to apportion rights or
liabilities to multiple parties; comparative negligence
between programmer, owner, and user, for example.
Some of these rules may be subject to variations,
exclusions or fine tuning through contract. But having an
identifiable status vis-à-vis a robot will naturally
facilitate the development of contractual rules and
practices relating to robots as well. They key thing is that
there will always be a responsible human (or at least a
corporation) who can be identified, with Robots effectively
being treated as “permanent children” as far as liability
for their acts and attribution of their property are
concerned.121
For those concerned with what the author considers to be largely
speculative philosophical questions such as “should robots have
freedom of speech” or “should robots be granted personhood,” the
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Whatever the informational and technical
registration parameters of the system are, it will be
desirable that they are capable of expansion and
modification. The system will need to be able to evolve to
reflect technological developments and new regulatory
requirements, including the ability to expunge
requirements that are obsolete or no longer appropriate.
E. The Robot Koseki as a Soft Law and
Private Law Initiative
One important difference between the Robot Koseki and
the Japanese Koseki is that a robot registry could be
established first through industry action, starting first as
a creature of code, of soft law and technical standards.
This being the case, it could be driven primarily by
industry players, professional associations or open
standards organization comparable to the Internet
Engineering Task Force, which has developed many of the
rules and standards governing the technical aspects of the
Internet.122 In the same way that industry standards and
Robot Koseki would also provide an answer. Registration in the Robot
Koseki would be the first step to possible “adulthood”—autonomy free
from the Koseki, or perhaps transfer to a higher order registry of
“sentient” robots that still contains features intended to secure
human control, oversight and safety. Such concerns will remain in the
realm of science fiction for the foreseeable future (hopefully). See also,
F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability,
Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1862 (2014)
(stating some authors have suggested that sophisticated robots may
have such high levels of learning and autonomy that they could be
treated as employees under the respondeat superior doctrine (which
imposes vicarious non-fault liability on employers), as children, or as
animals (which could also result in non-fault liability of owners or
users)).
122
See generally THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE,
https://www.ietf.org/. The Internet Protocol (IP) and WiFi originate
Journal of Business & Technology Law
461

The Robot Koseki

soft law have brought us much of the generally
interoperable technologies that drive the Internet and
many of the devices connected to it, whether it is Internet
Protocol, WiFi, USB, or countless other commonly used
technologies, the development of the Robot Koseki does
not need to wait for government action.123
The likelihood that the system will be based in
code is another reason why it is probably unnecessary for
the government to drive a registration initiative. To the
extent that the system operates through computer code
that automatically prevents non-conforming robots from
being registered and enables other technology systems to
decide automatically whether and how to interact with
those that are, formal legal rules will be unnecessary to
govern those interactions.
It should thus be feasible to establish a private
consortium-based Robot Koseki system. The key, however,
will likely be in the establishment of one that has
sufficient utility to government bodies (including courts)
from standards developed by the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE). https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/
7100280/. The USB standard was originally developed through a
consortium of computer hardware manufacturers. UNIVERSAL SERIAL
BUS, http://www.usb.org/home (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
Organizations like the Robotic Industries Association whose activities
include setting standards for robot safety already exist, of course,
though they do not appear to be addressing the subject in the context
of Robotic identity. See, e.g., ROBOTICS INDUS. ASS’N, https://www.
robotics.org/robotic-standards (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
123 Who We Are, WIFI ALLIANCE, https://www.wi-fi.org/who-we-are
(last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (stating that a WiFi alliance of industry
players supporting the standard exists); About, USB, http://
www.usb.org/about (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (stating USB
Implementers Forum was founded by a group of companies); Global
Robotic Standards, ROBOTICS INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http://www.
robotics.org/robotic-standards (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (discussing
that organizations like the Robotic Industries Association include
activities such as setting standards for robot safety).
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that are able to use it as a framework for developing hardlaw rules and regulations of the type posited above. By
way of example, governments in some countries are
already requiring commercial providers of “smart bike”
bicycle sharing services to incorporate geo-fencing
technology, though they did not develop the technology
itself. 124 The likelihood of similar requirements being
imposed on Robots in such countries and elsewhere seems
high but could be readily accomplished through an
existing registration system.
The challenge will be in allowing industry to
develop a system that is not too favorable to robot
designers and owners, one that obfuscates liability rather
than clarifies it. Here is where at least some degree of
government involvement (or perhaps judicial activism)
will be desirable. In order for the system to have broad
social utility, it will need to make as many people as
possible feel safe about robots, or at least Robots. Social
utility could see the development of a virtuous cycle which
encourages more people to register their robots in the
Robot Koseki, and in doing so satisfy the registration
parameters. Governments can facilitate this goal by
incorporating a registration requirement into regulations
or procurement specifications that involve robots.125
Yingzhi Yang, Singapore Requires ‘Geofencing’ for all BikeSharing Operators in the City by the End of this Year, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (June 4, 2018), http://www.scmp.com/tech/enterprises/
article/2149218/singapore-requires-geofencing-all-bike-sharingoperators-city-end.
125 Concerns about the impact of robotic liability on innovation seems
an obvious area where the registration system could be used to grant
advantages to registration that would not accrue to unregistered
robots. Such concerns have been well expressed by Ryan Calo, among
others. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571 (2011).
Some might argue that complying with the various restraints of the
registration system would hinder innovation, but that would be the
124
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F. Robots and the Internet of Things
Not only will the Robot Koseki be a creature of technology,
but it will be one of networked technology. Robots and
other technology systems that interact with the registry
will need to be able to communicate with the registry
system through the Internet or other network technology.
The system would need to work in a way so that that the
current registration details of each Robot was accessible
to other technology systems (which might include other
Robots) interacting with it. There are doubtless numerous
design strategies. It could be based on a centralized or
distributed database system. It could be based wholly or
in part on blockchain or a similar distributed ledger
system (which would facilitate incorporating robots into
payment systems). Whether robots themselves would act
as components of the network/ledger, or passively interact
with it would, along with the foregoing other
considerations, be a design choice that may be driven by
the technical capabilities reflected in the registration
parameters that individual robots must satisfy. To the
extent robots may incorporate private data in the
informational data fields or whatever sensory and
recording equipment it incorporates, it may be necessary
to establish various levels of access to the Robot, such as
distinguishing between technical information that may be
freely accessible, but personal information about owners
and users or video/sound data recorded on internal
storage media which could require a higher level of access
or some element of legal process.
The distributed nature of the system would mean
compromise. In any case, it is an unusual argument that persons who
receive no direct benefit from robotic innovations should bear some of
the costs in the form of damage to their property, physical injury, or
even death.
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that, like the Internet itself, it would be relatively
unconstrained by borders, unless efforts are put into
imposing such through constraints. Examples could
include mandatory geo-fencing constraints that affect
operability outside or within political borders. Since
Robots will have a significant data-gathering capability,
the impact of various personal data protection regimes
may be a factor. Depending on the nation involved, this
may be a primary reason for government involvement in
the development of the Robot Koseki system, or at least
the local version of it.
G. A System of Systems
While for ease of reference this article generally refers to
“the” Robot Koseki as a single system, the existence of
multiple systems is possible or even desirable. For
example, if the jurisdiction-specific registration systems
do develop as anticipated in the previous section, there
would be pressure for them to be inoperable to an extent.
This could in turn facilitate the development of legal or de
facto “robot nationality” or at least the rules addressing
the legal status of robots who cross national borders.126
It may also be possible that even within a single
One set of questions that few discussing robot law seem to have
asked, let alone tried to answer is: what happens—or should
happen—when a robot autonomously decides to cross a border? Has
the border been illegally crossed in some way? Does anything happen
to the property rights of the owner in such a Robot? Edmund
Mokhtarian proposes robots with “international modules” that allow
them to switch to compliance with a different set of laws upon crossing
a border. Edmund Mokhtarian, The Bot Legal Code: Developing a
Legally Compliant Artificial Intelligence, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
145, 150 (2018). This could indeed be a valuable component of a
comprehensive registration system such as proposed in this paper,
but does not actually answer any of the above questions.
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jurisdiction there will be multiple, overlapping or even
competing systems. It may transpire that the tremendous
possible variety of robots means that different systems are
needed. To the extent Robots can be modified and
upgraded (or downgraded), it may also be possible for
them to ‘evolve’ and become eligible for higher order
registry systems that enjoy greater regulatory, social or
commercial benefits. Perhaps there can even be a process
for dealing with the question that some in the field of robot
law and ethics are already discussing—what should
happen to a robot who becomes self-aware? They can
either be transferred to the highest order of Koseki or “set
free” from all registration requirements, having matured
away from the status of “permanent child” that the Robot
Koseki is otherwise designed to impose. This takes us well
into the realm of science fiction, but just as the Japanese
koseki system enables children to leave the parental
registration upon maturity, a Robot Koseki would solve
another problem that is already discussed by those in the
fields of robot law and ethics.
Finally, even a single Robot Koseki would
naturally come to be part of a “system of systems” as other
technologies developed to interact with it. The simplest
example would be access restrictions that allow registered
Robots into public spaces but exclude unregistered ones,
similar to pet door flap that only open for the animal(s)
with the appropriate embedded RFID chip. More complex
examples would be payment systems that enable robots to
transact independently of human decision and for tax
liabilities to be imposed and paid appropriately.
V.

CLOSING REMARKS

This article has attempted to illustrate how comparative
law may provide a useful but different set of analogies for
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thinking about how robots should be regulated. At risk of
repetition, the view of the author is that one of the most
important and basic tasks facing practical robot law is
definitional; both the establishment of a definition of
“robot” itself, as well as specific attributes (the
registration parameter) of a robot that can provide
adequate structure for further regulation, whether
through law or private ordering. In short, the key task is
to establish rules of robotic identity. The technical aspects
of a Robot Koseki will be a matter for technologists to
develop, but it is hoped that the primarily western-driven
focus of robot law can benefit from analogies from other
legal systems of the world.127
Perhaps someday in the future the Robot Koseki
will even see the overthrow of Asimov’s laws of robotics.
Perhaps someday the first law of robots will be: A Robot
Shall be Registered in the Robot Koseki.
At the time of writing the author had filed a utility patent
application for a robot registry system.
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